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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

7 SCHNITZER STEEL INDUSTRIES,  
8 INC.,

9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 MILTON SESSLER; PACIFIC HIDE  
& FUR DEPOT, a Montana  
12 corporation doing business as Pacific  
Steel & Recycling; PACIFIC HIDE &  
13 FUR DEPORT, doing business as  
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, a Montana  
14 corporation; PACIFIC HIDE & FUR  
DEPOT, INC., a Washington  
15 corporation,

Defendants.

NO: 4:17-CV-5040-RMP

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S  
MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY  
RESTRAINING ORDER

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17 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining  
18 Order, ECF No. 3. The Court has reviewed the motion and the record and is fully  
19 informed.

20 Plaintiff filed this suit on March 27, 2017, then filed a Motion for a  
21 Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on April 7, 2017, ECF No. 3. The Court

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY  
RESTRAINING ORDER ~ 1

1 denied Plaintiff's request to expedite hearing of that motion, ECF No. 9, and  
2 provided the parties sufficient time to fully brief Plaintiff's request for preliminary  
3 relief. *See* ECF No. 41. An evidentiary hearing was held on May 24, 2017, and  
4 the Court heard oral argument regarding Plaintiff's requests. Plaintiff was  
5 represented by attorneys of record, Richard Hunt and Kevin Curtis. James King  
6 and Samuel Thilo appeared on behalf of Defendant Sessler; and Kimberly Kamel  
7 and Timothy Lawlor appeared on behalf of the Pacific Defendants.

## 8 **DISCUSSION**

9 The Court may enter a temporary restraining order pursuant to FED. R.  
10 Civ. P. 65, which states in relevant part:

11 The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or  
12 oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

13 (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show  
14 that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the  
15 movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and  
16 (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give  
17 notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

18 Although Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order on an expedited  
19 basis, *see* ECF No. 3 at 4, Plaintiff clarified its intent to allow Defendants to  
20 respond to the motion for a TRO. *See* ECF No. 9. In any case, the Court found an  
21 insufficient basis to grant a TRO without full briefing by the parties regarding  
Plaintiff's request for the TRO. *See* ECF No. 41.

"The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is the same as that  
for the issuance of preliminary injunction." *Dahlstrom v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian*

1 *Tribe of Washington*, No. C16-0052JLR, 2017 WL 413201, at \*2 (W.D. Wash.  
2 Jan. 31, 2017) (citing *New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.*, 434  
3 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977)). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and  
4 drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, *by a clear*  
5 *showing*, carries the burden of persuasion.” (emphasis in original). *Lopez v.*  
6 *Brewer*, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520  
7 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). Ordinarily, to obtain a preliminary injunction,  
8 the moving party must “demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits of  
9 such a claim; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of  
10 preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that an  
11 injunction is in the public interest.” *Lopez*, 680 F.3d at 1072 (citing *Winter v.*  
12 *Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

13 In conjunction with the four-part post-*Winter* test, the Ninth Circuit Court of  
14 Appeals has stated that “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of  
15 hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a  
16 preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood  
17 of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” *League of*  
18 *Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton*, 752 F.3d  
19 755, 759 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632  
20 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)).

1           **(1) Likelihood of success on the merits**

2           Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sessler signed an employment agreement  
3 with Plaintiff and that Mr. Sessler violated the terms of the agreement following  
4 his transfer to Defendant Pacific. *See* ECF No. 3 at 4. However, Defendants have  
5 submitted evidence and raised serious questions about the enforceability of the  
6 alleged employment agreement and the terms that underlie a number of Plaintiff's  
7 claims. *See e.g.*, ECF No. 25 at 4-5. At this juncture, the Court finds that Plaintiff  
8 has failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its  
9 claims that are based on the relevant contract that may not be enforceable.

10          Two of Plaintiff's employees testified at the hearing that Plaintiff will suffer  
11 irreparable injury without the TRO because of the "trade secrets" and  
12 "confidential" and "proprietary information" that they allege were taken and used  
13 by Mr. Sessler when he left Plaintiff's company to work for Pacific. However, the  
14 Court finds that Plaintiff's allegations are not supported by persuasive evidence,  
15 but rather are based on Plaintiff's assumptions and speculations.

16          In rebuttal, Mr. Sessler testified that although he had forwarded some of  
17 Plaintiff's documents to his personal email account with the idea that he could  
18 adapt the format to use in his new job, that he either deleted those documents or  
19 removed them from his computer and returned them to Plaintiff prior to the hearing  
20 in this matter. Mr. Sessler credibly testified that he never used the documents for  
21 the benefit of his new employer, Pacific, or for his own business interests.

1 In addition, the CEO of Pacific, Jeff Millhollin, also testified that he never  
2 saw or used any of the relevant documents from Plaintiff, and that he never asked  
3 Mr. Sessler to solicit employees from Plaintiff's company. Mr. Millhollin also  
4 testified that he ordered Mr. Sessler to return all of Schnitzer's documents to them.  
5 Further, Mr. Millhollin directed Mr. Sessler and his subordinate, who also had  
6 worked previously for Schnitzer, to only contact suppliers and customers in the  
7 Spokane area.

8 Based on the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds  
9 that Mr. Sessler returned or deleted all of the documents that Plaintiff alleges were  
10 improperly taken. The Court also finds that at this juncture, Plaintiff has failed to  
11 establish any wrongdoing by Pacific as there is no evidence that Pacific ever saw  
12 or used the relevant documents or any information that Mr. Sessler had taken from  
13 Plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of  
14 success on any claim that is before the Court. The first of the Court's four  
15 considerations weighs heavily in Defendants' favor.

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18 <sup>1</sup> The Court is not making a finding regarding whether Pacific would have  
19 committed wrongdoing had they used the information to their benefit. Plaintiff has  
20 not yet proved the validity and enforceability of the alleged contract signed by Mr.  
21 Sessler.

1           **(2) Irreparable harm**

2           Failure to show that irreparable harm will result in the absence of a  
3 preliminary injunction is fatal to a request for such relief. *See All. for the Wild*  
4 *Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (“*Winter* tells us that  
5 plaintiffs may not obtain a preliminary injunction unless they can show that  
6 irreparable harm is likely to result in the absence of the injunction.”). Plaintiff  
7 argues that Defendants already have been taking customers and employees from  
8 Plaintiff and could continue to do so absent a TRO or preliminary injunction, and  
9 that “[i]ntangible injuries such as threatened loss of goodwill can result in  
10 irreparable harm.” ECF No. 3 at 8.

11           As the Court finds that all relevant information was returned without being  
12 used and that Plaintiff has not established that Defendants improperly solicited any  
13 of Plaintiff’s employees, the Court also finds that there is no impending harm.  
14 However, even if the Court were to accept the validity of Plaintiff’s arguments,  
15 Plaintiff fails to show how a preliminary injunction is necessary to show  
16 *irreparable* harm. Plaintiff does not allege any damage that could not be  
17 quantified as monetary damages in the event that Plaintiff were to succeed at trial.

18           The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to make an adequate showing of  
19 irreparable harm that would justify the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of a  
20 preliminary injunction or a TRO.

1           **(3) The balance of equities**

2           Plaintiff argues that it may lose additional customers, employees, and “good  
3 will” without preliminary relief. *See generally* ECF No. 3. However, as  
4 previously stated, Plaintiff’s evidence fails to demonstrate how these alleged  
5 hardships could not be remedied by monetary damages if they are proven at trial.  
6 Furthermore, the only supplier that Plaintiff could reference as an example of lost  
7 business, Sutton, has since returned its business to Plaintiff.

8           On the other hand, imposing restrictions on Defendants’ businesses absent  
9 good cause would be an unjust remedy. Given the Court’s findings at this  
10 preliminary stage of litigation, any damage that Plaintiff might suffer is far  
11 outweighed by the unreasonable restrictions that would be imposed upon  
12 Defendants by a TRO. In addition, Plaintiff already is forcing Pacific and Mr.  
13 Sessler to face significant litigation costs to respond to voluminous filings in this  
14 case. Considering the foregoing, the balance of the equities tips heavily in  
15 Defendants’ favor.

16           **(4) Public Interest**

17           Plaintiff argues that the public has an interest in the enforcement of valid  
18 contracts and the restraint of unfair competition.<sup>2</sup> *See* ECF No. 3 at 10. As

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20           <sup>2</sup> Plaintiff also references public interest in enforcing statutes and protecting business  
21 investments; however, it has failed to demonstrate how a TRO would serve such purposes here.

1 previously discussed, the enforceability of the contract terms relied upon by  
2 Plaintiff is questionable, and Plaintiff's allegations of unfair competition and theft  
3 of trade secrets are unfounded at this stage of litigation. The public interest is not  
4 served by Court orders that limit business activities absent just cause.

5 **CONCLUSION**

6 In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that entering a TRO  
7 or a preliminary injunction would not be appropriate in this matter. Accordingly,  
8 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining  
9 Order, **ECF No. 3**, is **DENIED**.

10 The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to  
11 counsel.

12 **DATED** May 26, 2017.

13 *s/ Rosanna Malouf Peterson*  
14 ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON  
15 United States District Judge  
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